Barack Obama v George Bush: Realist Analysis

On January 20, 2009 Barack Obama took office after running on a campaign of hope and change. This essay will examine the first 10 months of his presidency, and compare it to the rule of his predecessor, George W. Bush. Several policy areas will be examined, with special focus paid to international security issues, including the wars and occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the fate of the Europe-based missile defence shield within the context of a stronger Russia, and the foreign policy toward North Korea and Iran, especially as relates to their respective nuclear ambitions. Recognition will be given to the so-called Bush Doctrine, a four pillared policy framework of preemption, unilateralism, American primacy and democracy promotion, and it will be compared to the actions of Obama along these lines. Further, the major international events that occurred during the Bush and Obama presidencies will be discussed in terms of the underlying theoretical frameworks influencing them, as well as the presidents' respective foreign policy responses. From this analysis, it will be noted that there have been several course corrections between the administrations, with a renewed focus being placed on the neo-Liberal ideas of multilateralism and institution-building by Obama, even if in name only. However, it will be shown that the underlying state of the international political system is one of continuity, reflecting the dominant ideological realities of the realist/neo-realist tradition.
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It is important to begin this discussion with an examination of the ideology known as the Bush Doctrine. This framework, which led to George W. Bush becoming the least popular president, both at home and abroad, of the modern era, was the guiding force of the administration. This set of four interrelated policies has been described as the 'new realism' (Legro & Moravcsik, 2001), interesting since it has been heavily criticized by those from the 'old realism'. The first policy that will be examined is that of preemption. This meant that the US was willing to defend its national interest by seeking out and neutralizing threats abroad before they materialized. This type of prescient forecasting has been criticized by realists, who say that a better tactic is often containment, rather than preemption, since in fact many threats will never metastasize from the possible to the actual (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2008). Despite this realist critique, the policy of preemption is not altogether foreign to the realist tradition, encapsulating as it does the self-help nature of the anarchic international system. Essentially, this policy reflected the fact that the US felt it could depend on no one but itself to defend its interests, and in light of the state-sponsored terror witnessed firsthand on September 11, it was thought that it was no longer possible to wait for an attack to be imminent before striking back. This conflux of analysis is illustrative of the often contradictory nature of particular administrations' foreign policy, especially that of Bush, since only rarely do the actions of a nation or leader align completely with traditional theoretical frameworks. However, it can be seen that preemption was thought to be a practical extension of realism for Bush.
Unilateralism is another component of the Bush Doctrine which has been widely criticized. While George W. Bush paid lip service to the idea of multilateralism as the preferred method of operations in conducting international relations, he made it clear that the US would protect and defend its perceived interests alone if necessary. This was especially evident in America's coalition led into Iraq, which, as will be shown, lacked support from any other nation of consequence with the notable exception of the United Kingdom (Baylis et al., 2008), and also in the resistance to bilateral talks with North Korea, despite the urgings of several foreign nations (Jervis, 2003). This kind of unilateral action is emblematic of realist notions of survival and self-help; it shows how realists argue that the survival of the state is a preeminent goal, an idea which for Bush meant doing what was felt to be in American interests no matter the diplomatic cost, and to rely only upon the US state to accomplish necessary goals. It is worth noting that many realists questioned the magnitude of the threat to American survival which these actions addressed (Baylis et al., 2008). Furthermore, the international condemnation of US actions during this time helps illustrate the imperviousness of American foreign policy to appeals for morality. Ceding to such appeals in the face of national self-interest would be a violation of one of the longest running themes of realist thought, contained within the notion of raison d'ètat. This belief suggests that the state serves as its own moral justification, excusing otherwise horrific acts to protect domestic security, and has been prevalent since Machiavelli (Baylis et al., 2008). The actions of the US toward suspected terrorists, civilians killed in questionable wars, and their use of unmanned Predator drones all exemplify behaviour that would be considered immoral (not to mention illegal) if conducted by any body other than a state. This resistance by states to common notions of morality, and the consistency and frequency with which immoral acts are perpetrated, demonstrate the longevity and wide applicability of this aspect of realism. The Bush Doctrine tenet of unilateralism if necessary, though criticized by many realists, can be seen to be merely an extension of realist thought.
American primacy was a core feature of Bush's presidency, and was combined with an anti-terrorist stance following the September 11 attacks on US soil. This idea conveys the notion that America, as the sole superpower in the current global system, has the right and indeed the duty to use its hegemonic position to promote its interests and maintain the stability of the international system. This notion claims that by maintaining a qualitative superiority, a relative monopoly on power, the US can ensure that no other state will attempt to balance their power through its own buildup. Instead, other nations are more likely to follow a course of bandwagon-ing, wherein they support US policies in the hope of wresting enough relative gains to be able to mount an independent foreign policy in the future (Alway 2009; Baylis et al., 2008). This sense that 'peace and stability require the United States to assert its primacy in world politics' (Jervis, 2003) gives credence to the notion that, 'contrary to [defencive realism], all states cannot be treated as 'like units'' (Baylis et al., 2008). Instead, this Bush Doctrine tenet was predicated upon the 'dominant power behaving [sic] quite differently from the others' (Jervis, 2003), reflecting its dominant position as the sole superpower. Through examining the concept of American primacy, it is clear that realist notions played into its formation, despite the questionable outcomes of its application.
Finally, democracy promotion rounds out the Bush Doctrine's core beliefs. This tenet has seen perhaps the most vocal opposition from traditional realists, stating as it does that the US will pursue the creation of democratic states abroad, if force by necessary (CLASS NOTES 4b). This policy is justified by thinking found more commonly under the umbrella of the democratic peace theory, which points out the rarity of wars between two democracies. This observation is explained by the belief that since democracies are representative of and responsible to their constituents, they will be less willing to go to war with each other, and that this is bolstered by increased cooperation in peaceful matters such as interconnected trade and international institution building (Baylis et al., 2008). This explanation is particularly non-realist, since it places emphasis on the domestic character of states as a determinant in their behaviour, and because it ignores the framework of deterrence and containment associated with realism. These Bush Doctrine points which have been examined have shown that George W. Bush was following an ideological framework distinct from the theoretical framework of realism, even if it was claimed to be the brainchild of this tradition, although it is possible to examine the outcomes of these policies from a realist perspective.
President Obama does not have a directly comparable ideological framework as his predecessor did, yet it is still possible to examine his stance toward many of the issues outlined in the Bush Doctrine to determine changes and continuities. Perhaps the biggest difference coming from the White House under Obama has been one of rhetoric. This has included a vocal distancing from Bush`s policies even where such a claim is not warranted. In regards to preemption, Obama has moved away from Bush`s ideals, preferring to seek a more conciliatory tone with `rogue` nations and dangers abroad. This also ties in to the idea of `unilateralism if necessary` (Alway, 2009), so heavily criticized during Bush`s presidency. Obama has been styled as a much more multilateral, cooperative president, and has demonstrated this already on issues from his response to the economic crisis (Chongkittavorn, 2009) to his diplomatic contact with Pakistan regarding terrorists on their shared border with Afghanistan. This type of behaviour has won praise and painted Obama as an institution builder, and seems in some cases to violate the realist notion of the separate morality which is applicable to states. This can be seen in comments such the mention of no longer making the "false ... choice between our safety and our ideals" (Goodman, 2009). This claim to popular morality is laid false, however, by the continued use of Predator strikes, as will be shown, the lack of normalized relations with Cuba, and finally the resistance to changing far-reaching laws implemented under Bush regarding everything from offshore prisons such as Guantanamo to the treatment of terrorist suspects (Baylis et al., 2008). The multilateral nature of Obama's presidency also relates to the Bush Doctrine policy of American primacy. Obama has sustained criticism for following in his predecessor`s footsteps in this regard, and for lacking to sufficiently prepare for the rising BRIC superpowers of Brazil, Russia, India and China. This violates a core principle of realist thought, wherein the action of a state is in response to uncertainty about the motives of other states. This paranoia should be manifesting itself as a comprehensive plan to deal with the looming possibility of the end to American hegemony and a return to a multi-polar world, but instead the Obama administration is focused on the leftover foreign policy entanglements of the Bush era. Thankfully, when it comes to the issue of democracy promotion, by force if necessary, Obama seems to have learned from the mistakes of his predecessor. He has distanced himself from the idea (Forsyth, 2009), and seems content to focus his relations with other states on issues where there is common ground, rather than Bush`s tendency to push democratic reforms at meetings on a wide range of other policy issues (even while facing criticism for violating human rights at home and abroad). Through this comparison between the Bush Doctrine and Obama`s stance on its beliefs, it has been shown that there has been a break from the past, although it is debatable whether this represents more than a rhetorical shift away from unpopular tenets. Throughout the rest of this essay specific policy issues will be examined to help understand the differences and similarities of these presidents and the meaning of their foreign policy within a realist framework.
George W. Bush faced a watershed moment in the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington. The nature of the attacks, by a non-state, global actor disconnected from traditional realist principles such as sovereignty over territory, seemed to bring into question one of the core realist ideas, that of the primacy of the state as actor on the international stage (Baylis et al., 2008). However, Bush initiated a US-led coalition in military engagement against Afghanistan - a state - showing a reliance on a realist modus operandi. The fact that the actions of a small number of al-Qaeda terrorists (9/11 Report, 2004) led to a de facto war against a foreign nation reinforced weakened realist notions of the primacy of states (Baylis et al., 2008); essentially, Bush could not conceivably conduct war against a non-state actor, and so the Taliban-led government of Afghanistan was substituted.
Another way in which the realist tradition is relevant to Bush's policy toward Afghanistan is his initially liberal view toward the outcome of combat. In 2002, the language of the National Security Strategy refined the realist 'balance of power idea to incorporate democracy promotion' (Pressman, 2009). Based on this Bush Doctrine policy, and a subscription to democratic peace theory ideas about relations between democratic states, President Bush was optimistic. He espoused views about the possibility of economic progress and peace by overthrowing the undemocratic regime and pushing free trade, an agenda which horrified many realists (Jervis, 2003). However, the administration's initial optimism about bringing freedom to the Afghani people was met with the cold realist reality of a bloody, drawn out occupation and Taliban/al-Qaeda insurgency, felt by many to be unable to liberate the Afghan people (Occupation Will Never, 2009). There have of course been complicating factors in the Afghanistan war, namely the unplanned for 'blowback' effect in combination with a severe shortage of troops (Eland, 2009), but overall the results of the war have tended to discredit Bush's liberal beliefs. These events show how the Bush's involvement in Afghanistan initially questioned realist notions of who were the main units of the international stage, and also the role of the US in promoting democracy and free trade, but have come to reinforce realist views of anarchy-linked states lacking an overarching authority.
President Obama inherited the combat situation in Afghanistan, so it is difficult to make a direct comparison, but it is noteworthy that he has maintained and greatly increased the involvement of the US military in the embattled nation (Ghattas, 2009). Furthermore, Obama has maintained support for the corruption riddled Karzai government since the Afghanistan President was reelected. The election was noted for 'widespread fraud' (Tait, 2009) in Karzai's favour, which resulted in the withdrawal of the other candidate. This can be seen as a calculation made on the relative gains of the US having to topple the Karzai government or support a second election, which would be extremely costly in terms of political prestige for both nations, but would have benefited the embattled nation more than the US. Obama`s continued involvement and support for Karzai shows realist calculations which determine American foreign policy. By ignoring the calls from several domestic and non-state groups for a reelection, Obama showed a realist tendency to hold the state above the influence of individual-level politics. Another interesting point is that Obama`s White House has been lowering expectations for the outcome in Afghanistan (as well as Iraq). This can be seen as a softening up of global (and domestic) anticipations for results, and can be analyzed as a way of protecting the reputation of the US should the actual outcomes be unfavourable.
More evidence of the continuity between Obama and Bush's foreign policy and the underlying realist explanations can be seen in an examination of the war in Iraq. When President Bush began the combat in Iraq, many leading realists were vocally opposed (Baylis et al., 2008), claiming that the war was not in America's interest, and was instead a dangerous exercise in democracy promotion by force (Wolfowitz, 2009). The then-President was accused of following idealistic ideology, as captured in the nature of the Bush doctrine. While this is indisputably true, it is however likely that Bush truly thought that the fighting would be in America's interest. One way in which this can be seen is as an increase in the nation's 'resource endowment' (Baylis et al., 2008), according with the structural realist notion of the power-capabilities of a state. To this effect, there is some evidence that the US controlled interim government of Iraq was extremely favourable to American interests by ensuring US control of Iraq's oil fields, mainly through the liberalization of resource laws (Klein, 2007). Securing these resources for use by Americans may prove increasingly profitable and fortuitous as global oil reserves decline in the coming decades, and their increasing worth will have to be weighed against the direct costs incurred now. Despite this long-term resource play, the disastrous consequences of such an ideologically motivated war suggest the utility of realist paradigms was violated by Bush with predictably horrendous outcomes.
America's involvement in Iraq under Bush was also realist in a more narrow sense. The pretext for the use of force was the fear of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (Gilligan, 2009), which, although they never materialized, exemplifies the focus of realists on power (Baylis et al., 2008), in this case the destructive power of nuclear capabilities. It also showed how the policy of non-intervention, which characterizes notions of sovereignty, often 'does not apply in relations between great powers and their 'near abroad'' (Baylis et al., 2008). It is interesting to note that realist interpretations of nuclear proliferation suggest that all states will attempt to gain nuclear weapon capabilities in order to ensure their own security, and therefore that nonproliferation efforts should be focused on the supply side (Hymans, 2006). The negative consequences of the Iraq war suggest Bush`s decision to break from traditional realist notions of proliferation was not in the best interest of the US. This all shows the power of the realist framework as it applied to Bush`s approach to Iraq.
Since Obama has come to power he has been focused on removing troops from Iraq. This can not be seen as a major departure from the policies of Bush, since the withdrawal plan had been suggested under the former president (Obama Rejects Bush, 2008). Additionally, the US army is under severe pressure, and the troops serving in Iraq are desperately needed elsewhere, namely Afghanistan and Pakistan. In fact, if the ultimate goal of any state 'is to achieve a hegemonic position in the international system' (Baylis et al., 2008), Obama's choice to remove the troops can be seen as an attempt to maintain America's position as the leader of the current unipolar system. In light of their over-stretched military and the economic problems plaguing the US, not least of which is fighting two major engagements abroad, a quick withdrawal from Iraq is extremely necessary. Essentially, facing a conflux of problems, this withdrawal is as much in America's self interest as Bush thought the engagement was years earlier, demonstrating the primacy of realist notions of survival and self-help.
US relations with the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) are another policy issue where the continuity of the international system can be seen between the Bush and Obama administrations. Throughout the Bush presidency, these relations were characterized by carrot-and-stick attempts to apply positive or negative sanctions in order to bargain for concessions from the isolationist nation, mostly in relation to the ongoing nuclear aspirations of the DPRK. Sanctions applied by President Bush include the cut-off of heavy-fuel oil in 2002 (Shambaugh, 2003). In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (Baylis et al., 2008). Bush pursued a hardline approach which quickly flexed into a gentler approach when the DPRK tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006 (Sutter, 2009). This softening and increased diplomacy, within the framework of the Six-Party Talks, at first appears to suggest a neo-liberal tendency favouring pluralism and the achievement of 'absolute gains through cooperation' (Baylis et al., 2008). However, North Korea did not fulfil the terms of deals which resulted (Sutter, 2009), highlighting realist concerns with noncompliance of international agreements. Toward the end of his presidency, Bush refused to engage in the bilateral talks wanted by the DPRK, despite the pressure from other concerned nations to engage. It should be noted again that the pursuit of nuclear capabilities is seen by realists as a natural extension of a state`s attempts to ensure security, and the fact that North Korea has resisted US sanctions and global pressure for years shows the realist nature of their foreign policy. This discussion of Bush's foreign policy toward North Korea shows that neo-Liberal ideology is at best a partial explanation of the predominantly realist-based international system.
When Obama came to office in 2009, his focus was spread between Iraq, Afghanistan, the economic recession, and his health-care reform pet project. North Korea was quickly added to the agenda as a major issue as Pyongyang began a series of provocations such as 'a long range ballistic missile test, a nuclear weapons test ..., withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks and resumption of nuclear weapons development' (Sutter, 2009). These behaviours in themselves help to illustrate the realist nature of the international system, as the DPRK is clearly demonstrating a self-help principle by seeking to maximize its power along offensive realist lines (Baylis et al., 2008). This helps to explain why North Korea would jeopardize its position in the international system (admittedly not a very good one) by risking the wrath of the United States. Simply, the DPRK is pursuing nuclear weapons in order to increase their relative power (Baylis et al., 2008), all at once, something unlikely to happen through diplomatic negotiations led by the US or other major powers, which will at best grant relative gains.
The thorny issue of missile defence has been tackled by both the Bush and Obama administrations. Bush maintained that the US had the right to build a permanent anti-ballistic missile defence system in eastern Europe (Brookes, 2008). This idea was given reinforcement by the actions of nations such as Iran, as well as by the discovery by the Washington Post and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of a laptop containing details for the production of advanced nuclear weapons (Brookes, 2008). This situation helps explain the so-called security dilemma found in realist literature. This dilemma posits that states, due to the insecurity found in an anarchic system, will seek to increase their power relative to other states as a way of ensuring their survival (Baylis et al., 2008). In this case, Bush felt insecurity about the intentions of overseas states (such as Iran, Iraw, North Korea, and potentially Russia), and so wanted to increase US power relative all other states. In turn, nations seeking nuclear abilities were themselves threatened by US power, as proximally indicated by Israel`s nuclear capabilities, and Russia viewed this plan with great suspicion. In all negotiations by Bush and other nuclear states, the stated goal is to keep other nations from losing their `nuclear innocence`, in order to maintain their relative advantage. This situation shows the power and prescience of the realist paradigm in predicting and explaining international events.
Obama has signalled what seems like a significant change in strategy regarding missile defence. To begin with, he has backed off from the Bush-era plans to focus anti-ballistic missiles in silos situated in European nations (Obama: Missile Defense, 2009). This in itself does not suggest a shift away from the realist paradigm, as it is based on newly gathered evidence about the nature of missile threats. These threats include those from North Korea and Iran, in the event their nuclear development programs bear fruit. Critics of this new approach claim it is an olive branch being offered to Russia, a nation which has been vocal in opposition to the stationing of US missile defence in what it considers its area of influence (Obama: Missile Defense, 2009). This so-called olive branch is seen by pundits as being a major concession without obvious benefit to US interests. Namely, it is seen as having greater relative gains for the former soviet state than for the US, although there is speculation that it is in return for Russia taking a harder stance toward Iran on nuclear issues (Obama: Missile Defense, 2009). This type of analysis neglects the reality that Obama is planning to station theatre-style anti-ballistics on nuclear submarines within the Mediterranean, essentially replacing permanent facilities with more mobile, though less long-range, deployment. It is also relevant to note that the US-Russia Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty) expires in December of 2009 (Nuclear Nonproliferation, 2009); a new agreement has been under works by leaders of the respective nations which has included talks not just about nuclear weapons and missiles but also the economy, shared security, environmental concerns and clean energy, and finally the threat of global terrorism conducted by al-Qaeda members (Nuclear Nonproliferation, 2009). This type of deceptive verbal maneuvering is wise considering the nature of the security dilemma (Baylis et al., 2008) seen in realist theory, because it serves to alleviate the paranoia of other nations without actually reducing the threat to them. Also, this conciliatory-style behaviour has been a cornerstone of Obama's young presidency, again highlighting a discrepancy with his predecessor's abrasive cowboy style of unilateralism and the projection of power.
A further note on Obama`s relation to the missile defence issue is that he received the Nobel Peace Prize for his rhetoric about nuclear disarmament, a surprise to many analysts. This is considered especially ironic given that he leads a nation embroiled in two overseas occupations and has maintained the controversial use of Predator drones in Afghanistan and increasingly Pakistan. The use of these drones is considered by many to be immoral, showing two further concepts of realist theory. Firstly it demonstrates the negligible effects of individuals, many of whom believe the unmanned Predator strikes to be immoral and indiscriminatory, and non-state actors such as Amnesty International, who argue against the drones both for humanitarian reasons as well as because they believe them to be in contravention of international law (Barnett, 2006). Secondly, it once again shows the concept of raison d'ètat, wherein the state is viewed as having its own moral prerogative, above and beyond common conceptions thereof. These examples once again show the prevalence of realism as a tool for understanding international relations.
This essay has examined several of the most pressing foreign policy issue areas of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. It has outlined the Bush Doctrine as an ideology connected to and in contrast with realism, and has reviewed Obama`s policy relationship with his predecessor`s namesake ideology. Further, this paper has traced several of the most pressing foreign policy issue-areas of the two presidents, namely the war and occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the position of the US toward Iran and North Korea, and the fate of the Europe-based missile-defence shield in Russia`s near abroad. Throughout this discussion it has been seen that many of the global events during the past eight years can be understood in relation to the dominant realist paradigm. The actual foreign policy decisions of the two presidents have been shown to be often, although certainly not always, realist in nature. In summation, it is clear that the continuities between the presidents are emblematic of the ongoing, underlying, realist nature of the international system.


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