Machiavelli's The Prince
Since Machiavelli's death in 1527, the Italian's name has become synonymous with duplicity, deceit, and amorality. His work The Prince was meant as a guidebook for a new ruler on how to gain and maintain power Yet a significant cornerstone of advice he offered was that “a ruler must take care … to avoid those things that will make him an object of hatred or contempt” (Machiavelli 1995, 56), a seeming incongruity from one with such a devious reputation. Yet further study on the recommendations Machiavelli offers to his Prince reveals that he proposes a path which, while taking a flexible approach to commonly held moral standards, still holds others' views to be of pragmatic importance. For this reason Machiavelli dictates a course of action which places highest importance on being feared, both by subjects and fellow rulers, followed by being loved, and that to be hated or held in contempt is to be avoided at all costs. This essay will explain the seeming incongruities of this advice, noting his deference to circumstance, by examining Machiavelli's advice to a Prince.
Primarily Machiavelli can be thought of as embracing a morality based on pragmatism. While he admits that action good is surely a preferable course of action, he is sure to make clear in his instructions to a Prince that morals must be swept aside at a moment's notice if need be. He writes that “anyone who wants to act the part of a good man in all circumstances will bring about his own ruin … [so] it is necessary for a ruler … to learn how not to be good” (Machiavelli 1995, 48). This typifies the advice of Machiavelli, which dictates a fluid style of leadership, responsive to the ever changing moods of fickle fate. Further, the author recommends avoiding “those evil qualities … compatible with holding on to power” (Machiavelli 1995, 48) if possible, but attempts to assuage the conscience of any Prince who finds it necessary to engage in them, since “above all you are supposed to have those vices a ruler needs if he is going to stay securely in power” (Machiavelli 1995, 49). Clearly based on this alone it is evident that Machiavelli's advice is at best an overall suggestion, to be discarded as circumstance demands.
Despite his flexibility, Machiavelli uses strong words in warning a Prince against inciting hatred. In order to explain how Machiavelli could recommend being feared above being loved, yet insist a Prince must avoid hatred, it is important to note that he outlines the causes of hatred rather narrowly. He claims that a ruler will “only be hated if [he] seize[s] the property or the women of [his] subjects and citizens” (Machiavelli 1995, 52). Because of this specific delineation of the causes of hatred, Machiavelli is able to suggest a wide range of detestable actions without concern that they would elicit hatred.
Machiavelli's semantic differentiation of the emotions a ruler should incite seems to be based on two aspects - that those actions which provoke fear are in some way expected, or within the rights of a ruler to commit, whereas those which result in hatred are those which violate the most basic human dignities. Further, that when actions cause the hatred of a small few, especially when they are a powerless minority, they in turn cause fear among the masses. For example, Machiavelli recommends that a ruler, when acquiring new territories in a region with a different culture, establish colonies as a way of strengthening control over the area (Machiavelli 1995). In order to do this, a Prince must steal the land of some of the people, to give to the new settlers. This necessarily, according to the definition he has set out, incurs the hatred of those whose land is appropriated. Yet Machiavelli notes the action will “offend only those from whom you seize fields and house... and they will be only a tiny minority” (Machiavelli 1995, 9). He further says that “those whom you offend will be scattered and become poor, so they will be unable to do you any harm” (Machiavelli 1995, 9), showing that to be hated is not so terrible so long as it does not become a widely held view. In noting that “all the rest … will be afraid to make a false move, for they will have before them the fate of their neighbors as an example of what might happen to them” (Machiavelli 1995, 9), Machiavelli shows that he is recommending a cost-benefit analysis to determine how a Prince may get the greatest benefit and deference from the most subjects. This clearly shows that Machiavelli believes that stealing a man's property or women may make him hate you, but will make others fear you, and so is not in fact to be avoided entirely.
Machiavelli instructs his Prince that “no ruler is secure unless he has his own troops … nothing is so fragile as a reputation for strength that does not correspond to one's real capacities” (Machiavelli 1995, 45). This threat to a Prince's power is a result of the fact that without his own troops he will come to be regarded with contempt, as an “armed man has … for the man without weapons” (Machiavelli 1995, 46). Furthermore, this contempt will express itself as a lack of respect from his troops, whom he “cannot trust” (Machiavelli 1995, 46). If not having one's own army is contemptible, then it is to be avoided whenever possible, since Machiavelli looks with scorn upon those rulers who are contemptible.
Machiavelli offers instructions on ways to minimize the negative effects of hatred, if it must be incurred. He recommends that “people should either be caressed or crushed” (Machiavelli 1995, 9). He feels that if one must commit an act that would inspire hatred, it is better to do it in such a way that the person who will hate you is severely weakened. In his own words, the person should be “injure[d] … in such a way that you do not have to fear their vengeance” (Machiavelli 1995, 9-10). This helps explain how the author can recommend that a new Prince should wipe out not just the previous, now-defeated leader, but also should exterminate local nobles and charismatic figures – and even their memory (Machiavelli 1995). Another method Machiavelli recommends is that a Prince commit undesirable actions in one fell swoop. He advises his Prince to “make a list of all the crimes you have to commit and do them all at once” (Machiavelli 1995, 30) so as to mask the full degree of his hateful actions. He further recommends that “whenever you have to kill someone, make sure you have a suitable excuse and an obvious reason” (Machiavelli 1995, 52), demonstrating he recommends taking hateful actions only when they will be supported by, or at least seem justified to, the populace. Surely these examples prove that Machiavelli views being hated as something to be avoided where possible, but that if hateful actions must be taken, they be mitigated or minimized.
In addition to avoiding or minimizing hatred, Machiavelli recommends a Prince manage his reputation. By so massaging his image, a ruler may gain ever more support from his citizens. He may do this by attempting to win his people's love, or by inciting their fear. To win their love, a Prince may institute good governance. Although introducing new government and institutions presents a dangerous time for a Prince, since those who are satisfied under the old system will resist strongly, and those who stand to gain will offer only the support of a skeptic, doing so is beneficial in the long run (Machiavelli 1995). In addition to the new elite that is created, and is made dependent on the Prince for their success, new institutions can help “render [the principality] peaceful and law abiding” (Machiavelli 1995, 51). This helps prevent disorder from spreading, “which leads to murders or looting” (Machiavelli 1995, 51), and therefore leads the populace to, in time, support the Prince even more. Another way a Prince may magnify the love of his people is the corollary of doing evil deeds all at once. He advises a Prince to “do good … little by little, so people can fully appreciate it” (Machiavelli 1995, 31). He goes on to recommend that a Prince court the affections of the masses rather than the elite, since the masses only want to be free of oppression, whereas the elite want, immorally, to oppress (Machiavelli 1995, 32). These examples show how Machiavelli believes that a Prince must seek to attain the support of his citizens, and demonstrate his pragmatic view that earning their love must be approach with a tactical eye.
Another way in which Machiavelli advises his Prince on manipulating his reputation is when he says that attempting to be generous may lead to a reputation for quite the opposite in the long run. He shows how a ruler who attempts to seem generous will have to finance his lavish favours for the few by raising taxes on the many (Machiavelli 1995). Since raising taxes is in effect a way for the Prince to seize some of his citizens' property, this is certain to incite their hatred, especially since the tax burden is so widespread, while the Prince's generosity will benefit “only a few” (Machiavelli 1995, 49). Machiavelli shows how a fiscally conservative policy of small government institutions benefits the people via low taxes, which in turn leads them to view the Prince as generous (Machiavelli 1995). This once more exemplifies Machiavelli's pragmatic approach to governance, with the goal of attaining the support of the greatest number of people for the lowest political cost.
Machiavelli make it clear that it is better to be feared than even loved. He claims that men are “ungrateful, fickle, deceptive and deceiving, avoiders of danger, eager to gain” (Machiavelli 1995, 52). By this he means that whatever warm feelings the masses have toward you - even love - are inconstant, uncertain, able to be swayed by circumstance beyond your control. He says that “men are less nervous of offending someone who makes himself lovable, than someone who makes himself frightening” (Machiavelli 1995, 52), an insightful view of the psychological workings of men. He goes on to say that “since men are wicked, they break whenever their interests are at stake” (Machiavelli 1995, 53), showing how love is an imperfect tool for garnering support, based on the whims of fate, whereas fear is a tool at the Prince's disposal, able to be deployed as necessary and with precision. This shows how Machiavelli believes that, for the Prince, garnering the obedience of his citizens is of primary importance. His pragmatic advice is that fear is a more useful tool in maintaining political power than even love.
Machiavelli's insights have garnered his work The Prince an ongoing importance in political theory, and more than earned him his Machiavellian reputation, This essay has shown that while he cautioned against actions arousing hatred or contempt, he understood expediency might require them, and offered ways to minimize their harm - to the Prince, rather than the citizenry. Machiavelli understood the need for the support of the masses, and called for a variety of deceptions, such as the appearance of piety, to help achieve it This support could primarily stem from the love of the people, which Machiavelli knew was powerful, if inconstant, or fear, which he knew to be the most powerful emotion, through which a Prince could control his citizens with ease and certainty. This is why Machiavelli argued that it is better for a prince to be feared than to be loved.
References
Niccolo, Machiavelli. 1995. The Prince. In Wootton, David, ed. and trans. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
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